Regulation of Securities Industry Intermediaries--Australian Proposals by Latimer, Paul
ARTICLES
REGULATION OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY
INTERMEDIARIES - AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS
PAUL LATIMER*
1. INTRODUCTION
In its one hundred ninety-eight page A Review of the Licensing
Provisions of the Securities Industry Act and Codes (Review) pub-
lished in October 1985,1 the Australian National Companies and Se-
curities Commission, upon reviewing the licensing provisions of the Se-
curities Industry Act of 1980 Commonwealth and Codes, stated what
many had long felt, that "the present licensing system is not working
adequately to provide adequate investor protection."'2 The Review con-
siders, instead, a move to the United States/Canadian model of super-
vised self-regulation by self-regulatory organizations (SROs) in combi-
nation with the maintenance of the existing method of regulation by the
Commission.3
This article endeavors to address the Australian proposals and to
compare them with the North American experience. In particular, the
article will initially review the various theories of occupational licen-
sure.4 Next, it will discuss the ramifications of self-regulation by
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has published numerous articles and notes in Australian university and professional
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' NATIONAL COMPANIES AND SECURITIES COMMISSION, A REVIEW OF THE LI-
CENSING PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ACT AND CODES (1985) (A dis-
cussion document with proposals for the reform of Part IV and other provisions, and
regulations of the Securities Industry Act and Codes relating to licensing of securities
industry participants) [hereinafter REVIEW].
, Id. para. 2.1.
* Id. paras. 10.1 -.66.
' See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
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SROs.5 The article will conclude with an examination of several eco-
nomic theories of regulation and their implications for the proposals in
the Review.6
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Australian Company Law
There is no nationwide control by the Australian Canberra-based
Federal Parliament of company and securities law in Australia's six
states and two territories. Uncertainties created by the High Court of
Australia's interpretation of the scope of the "corporation's power"
under the Australian Federal Constitution has resulted in the evolution
of a cooperative scheme of state- and territory-based regulation.8 The
system is comprised of the six states and the two territories (the Austra-
lian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, which joined the
scheme on July 1, 1986). By the "Formal Agreement" of December 22,
1978,' the six states and the federal government (which also adminis-
ters the Australian Capital Territory) bound themselves into a decision-
making structure for the establishment and implementation of the coop-
erative scheme, based upon coordinated regulation of the existing state
and territory infrastructures. Such regulation would be undertaken by
two bodies, the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities, and
the National Companies and Securities Commission. 0
The Ministerial Council, the political master of the cooperative
scheme, includes the Attorney General of each of the six states and the
s See infra notes 57-109 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
"The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for
the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . .For-
eign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the
Commonwealth." AUSTL. CONST. § 51.
' See, e.g., Companies Act, 1981, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 89, § 3(1) (act intended to
provide for the formation, regulation, and registration of companies within the Austra-
lian Capital Territory); Companies and Securities (Interpretation and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1980, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 68, § 3(1) (act intended to regulate the
securities industry in the Australian Capital Territory); Companies (Acquisition of
Shares) Act, 1980, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 65, § 3 (act intended to regulate acquisition of
shares of companies incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory); National Com-
panies and Securities Commission Act, 1979, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 173, § 6(3) (act
creating commission with power to recommend adoption of new laws or changes in
existing laws relating to the securities industry within the Australian Capital
Territory).
I REVIEW, supra note 1, at viii-ix (Preface). The "Formal Agreement" is a
Schedule to the National Companies and Securities Commission Act, 1979, AUSTL.
ACTS P. No. 173 (statute outlining basic powers of Ministerial Council created pursu-
ant to Formal Agreement of December 22, 1978).
10 REVIEW, supra note 1, at viii-ix (Preface).
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federal government. It has the overall responsibility for the operation
and administration of the regulatory plan."1
The National Companies and Securities Commission (Commis-
sion), the Australian equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), is largely responsible for policy development through
securities legislation and for the administration of the companies and
securities legislation. Based in Melbourne, it encompasses only a staff
of about eighty, a large number of whom are professionally qualified in
areas such as accounting, economics, and law. The legislation confers
on the Commission wide discretion and power over takeovers, company
administration, and legislative and administrative development. In es-
sence, the Australian legislation requires the licensing of all market ac-
tors, subject to the exemptions set out hereunder, so that their activities
can be supervised by the Commission and its delegates. Under the Se-
curities Industry Act of 1980 and Codes,12 licenses are divided into four
categories: 1)Dealer's license;" 2)Dealer's representative; 4 3)Invest-
ment adviser;1 5 and 4)Investment representative.1" Application forms
and procedures are set out in the Securities Industry Act and Codes
and Regulations and include specific grounds upon which registration
may be denied, 1 subject to the right to a hearing. 8 In addition, the
Commission can establish minimum fraud requirements for dealers."
This standard mirrors the U. S. provisions in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.20
At present the Australian securities legislation exempts several se-
curities market actors or products from regulation: life insurance com-
pany bonds, monies going to indirect personal investment (such as port-
folio management, equity trustees, life insurance), new insurance
products (such as cash management trusts), and the investment advisory
industry.2' Technical advances and the erosion of investment product
segmentation have led to diversification, as has internationalization of
the securities market through dealing in Australian shares on the
"I Id. See generally National Companies and Securities Commission Act, 1979,
AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 173 (statute created pursuant to Formal Agreement of December
22, 1978).
11 Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 66.
1- Id. § 43.
14 Id. § 44.
15 Id. § 45.
1o Id. § 46.
17 Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 66, § 48.
1s Id. § 62.
19 Id. § 51(3).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1982).
1 Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 66, § 4.
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London Stock Exchange and quoting Australian stock on NASDAQ
and the U.S. over-the-counter market.
Moreover, under the Securities Industry Act and Codes, external
surveillance occurs in various forms. The Commission has the power to
require information to be furnished, 2 to receive accounts and annual
statements, 2s and to revoke and suspend licenses.2" The Commission
can also apply to the court for various orders in the event of a violation
of the legislation, 25 including an order for the observance or enforce-
ment of either the business rules or listing rules of the stock exchange.28
The preexisting Corporate Affairs Commissions of each of the six
states and the two territories continue under the cooperative scheme as
decentralized delegates of the National Companies and Securities
Commission.
2.2. Licensing of Securities Industry Participants
The licensing of those dealing in securities, as well as those mer-
chandizing related information, is the basic mechanism of control used
in common law jurisdictions such as the United States, 27 Canada, 8 the
United Kingdom (U.K.),29 and Australia." °
22 Id. § 53.
23 Id. § 56; Part IV.
24 Id. § 59.
25 Id. § 14.
20 Id. § 42.
27 In the United States, licensing requirements for those dealing in securities is
provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1982). Section
15(a)(1) requires the registration of any securities broker or dealer falling within the
constitutional scope of the Act. Id. § 78o(a)(1). Section 15(b) details specific grounds
upon which such registration may be denied. Id. § 78o(b)(1). Similarly, Section 203
(c)(2), (e) of the Investment Advisers Act provides for denial of registration as an ad-
viser. Id. § 80b-3(c)(2), 3(c). Section 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
directs that the Commission establish minimum financial requirements for brokers and
dealers. Id. § 78o(c)(3). Exempted are banks, id. § 78c(a)(4)-(15), persons who do not
qualify as a "broker" or a "dealer", id. § 78o(c)(3), and investment advisers, id. §
78c(a)(20), 80b-2(a)(11), though the latter require registration under The Investment
Advisers Act.
External surveillance takes various forms, including authorizing the SEC to set
licensing standards, id. § 78o(b)(2), and to prescribe tests of competency. Id. Addition-
ally, willful violation of SEC rules is a felony under Section 78ff(a). L. Loss, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 693 (1983).
28 In Canada, Manitoba was the first province to impose a licensing requirement
for the sale of securities. Sale of Shares Act, 1912, 2 Geo. 5, ch. 75 (Man.).
1, In the United Kingdom, there is the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act,
1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 45, § 1.
1* In Australia, the origins of the regulation of dealers and investment advisers
and their representatives goes back to the Securities Industry Act, 1970/71 (N.S.W.,
Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia), drafted in response to securities industry
abuses that occurred during the 1960's and were later documented in SENATE SELECT
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The goals of licensing include the need to ensure the adequacy of
dealer capitalization, to exclude the untrained and unqualified from the
industry, to provide for and strengthen those rules in the public inter-
est, and to enforce compliance with ethical standards."' Underlying
these goals is the recognition that the quality of the service provided
cannot be judged by the consumer at the time of consumption, thus
potentially providing serious financial harm to the unknowing
customer.
The view is widely held, and is recognized in the Review, 2 that
Australia's current system of dealer-investment adviser licensing does
not achieve these goals. Initially, the volume of licenses issued, increas-
ing from some 4,000 in 1981 to some 14,000 in 1985, appears to be
beyond the regulatory capability of the current personnel."3 Moreover,
licensing is sometimes recognized as achieving only one purpose, that of
raising revenue for the regulator.
3 4
The conflict at the core of any licensing scheme is how to maintain
equilibrium, that is, how to make the distinction between financial sta-
bility, knowledge, and so forth, while recognizing licensing as an inter-
ference with freedom, a barrier to entry of an occupation, and an an-
ticompetitive creation of exclusivity by legislative decree.3 5 Any
licensing system must recognize that all have a right to earn a living,
and that the grounds on which registration is to be denied should be
specific, clearly defined in advance, and void of generalized and often
unchallengeable "public interest" requirements.
The Australian proposals are based on the premise that the pre-
sent system of licensing dealers, investment advisers, and their repre-
sentatives provides inadequate protection to investors. In particular, the
proposals seek to examine and resolve the following issues:
(1) Are investors in securities adequately protected by
COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE (Australian Government Publishing Ser-
vice 1974) [hereinafter RAE REPORT]. This Act was followed by comparable, although
not identical, legislation in South Australia in 1979. All this legislation was superseded
by the Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 66.
31 Submission to the Ontario Securities Commission on Bill 75, the Securities Act,
1974, Toronto Stock Exchange 34 (Oct. 11, 1974), cited in Connelly, The Licensing of
Securities Market Actors, in 3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CA-
NADA 1265, 1273 n.15 (1979).
32 REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 2.1-.5.
33 Id. para. 2.2.
34 See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 145 (1962).
35E.g., W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RE-
STRAINTS 144-52 (1956). But cf. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 144-49 (noting that
registration and certification more appropriately balance social costs and benefits than
licensure).
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present licensing arrangements? Is the reasonably well-in-
formed investor acting with reasonable caution apt to suffer
serious losses as a result of dishonesty or incompetence by
operators in the securities industry?
(2) Is continued occupational regulation of participants
in the securities industry justified? If so, what type of regu-
lation is appropriate - registration, certification, or
licensing?
(3) If licensing is to be retained - who should be li-
censed - principals, or representatives, or both? What cate-
gories of license holders are appropriate? What criteria are
relevant in determining licensing categories? What exemp-
tions, if any, should apply to licensing? Should restricted or
conditional licenses be granted?
(4) Who should perform the licensing function - a
government instrumentality or a self-regulatory organiza-
tion? If self-regulatory organizations do undertake a licens-
ing function, what checks and balances should be applied to
them?
(5) What criteria should apply to the grant of various
categories of licenses?
(6) Is it possible to justify prudential controls on license
holders? If so, on what basis should they be applied?
(7) What provisions should be made for monitoring and
enforcing the conduct of license holders and their compliance
with licensing provisions? Who should perform the enforce-
ment function?
(8) What types of misconduct would give rise to disci-
plinary action against a license holder? What disciplinary
actions are appropriate for specific types of misconduct?
What criteria should be used to determine whether a license
is to be suspended or revoked? 6
Designed to ensure efficiency, the Australian recommendations
suggest that their main achievement is to redistribute the existing regu-
latory burden away from the Commission regulators and toward the
SROs.
2.3. The Drafting of the Regulation
The preparation of the regulation proposed in the Review raises
6 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 1.4.
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significant questions. Economic and social theory, as well as practical
experience, show that legislation and administrative rules, once drafted,
often unintentionally favor the regulated. At the drafting stage, expert
evidence, input, and experience is required. This is normally available
only from the regulators, and the existing professional associations and
their members, based upon their own experience as sellers of the
service.
Any legislative action based on the Review should attempt to en-
sure the representation of all who may be interested. These uninten-
tional biases need to be counterbalanced by groups other than the prov-
iders of these services, such as consumer/user groups and commissioned
experts such as economists, academics, and others with different and
sometimes wider perspectives. Yet, consumer/user groups generally
lack the numbers, authority, and experience to get involved, especially
in the area of technical and specialized legislative development. Nor can
one expect the biases to be corrected by politicians or by the advisers
responsible for drafting the legislation or administrative action, as they,
like most experts, are not trained to recognize the ramifications of the
legislation. Politicians will not intervene to correct the proregulation
bias if no opposition is perceived.
3. THEORIES OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE IGNORED
Although the Review sets out the strengths and weaknesses of self-
regulation, 7 it overlooks the wealth of recent studies of the effects of
self-regulation. These studies conclude that self-regulation may lead to
cartelization for existing members of the regulated group by raising in-
comes of the regulated, both by reducing their supply and, if consumers
perceive licensing as raising competence, by increasing the demand for
their services.3
Occupational licensing generally results in barriers to entry in the
form of requirements of qualifications and apprenticeship. It also re-
stricts advertising, pricing, and client relations. It may further result in
37 Id. paras. 10.8-.10.
31 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 136-60; W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at
105-51; G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975); Benham & Benham, Reg-
ulating through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 421 (1975); Maurizi, Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 399 (1974); Duggan, Occupational Licensing and the Consumer Interest,
in A. DUGGAN & L. DARVALL, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW AND THEORY 163,
168-70 (1980); Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961).
39 See generally M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 137-60 (discussion of social
effects of licensure); W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 112-18 (comparing U.S. licen-
sure system with medieval guilds).
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the creation of a fund to compensate clients affected by dealing with
members of the licensed group.40 In short:
The thrust of occupational licensing, like that of the
guilds, is toward decreasing competition by restricting access
to the occupation; toward a definition of occupational pre-
rogatives that will debar others from sharing in them; to-
ward attaching legal consequences to essentially private de-
terminations of what are ethically or economically
permissible practices.41
Occupational licensing authorities exercise considerable control
over licensees through the power to delicense, the power to enforce ad-
herence to often anticompetitive codes of ethics, and the power to sup-
press information, new products, and new services.
3.1. Types of Occupational Licensure
42
The Review outlines the four forms of occupational regulation,"'
40 See generally REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 1.0-.38 (general discussion of
objectives of licensing participants in the Australian securities market); Connelly, supra
note 31, at 1269-76 (discussing goals of licensing of securities market actors); Benham
& Benham, supra note 38, at 421 (discussing effects of regulation of professions gener-
ally); Duggan, supra note 38, at 178-80 (evaluating role of compensation scheme with
licensure system).
41 W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 114.
' Why target securities professionals?
Chapter 5 of the REVIEW sets out the four objectives of licensing extracted from
the U.K. GOVERNMENT REPORT, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM -
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION (1985) [hereinafter GOWER RE-
PORT] as efficiency, competitiveness, confidence, and flexibility. REVIEW, supra note 1,
para. 5.2. These mirror the standards of "efficient, competitive and informal markets"
set out in the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1980, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 65, §
59, and those advanced in the RAE REPORT:
(i)... to maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the
capital market in the interests of economic development, efficiency and
stability.
(ii)... to ensure adequate protection of those who invest in the se-
curities of public companies and in the securities market.
RAE REPORT, supra note 30, at 16.15.
More searching justifications for the imposition of legal liabilities on market trans-
actors have been set out in Lodge & McCauley, Walking the Tightrope: The Compre-
hensive Liabilities of Securities Professionals in the United States, 5 J. COMP. Bus. &
CAP. MKT. L. 267, 268-70 (1980). The justifications are: (1)"Access" or "Passkey"
theory, by which securities markets constitute a valuable resource which if disrupted
will affect investor confidence. Pressure for enforcement of securities regulation accord-
ingly should fall on the securities professionals who control access to the market and
who are obliged to ensure that the market remains fair and orderly. (2) "Super Fiduci-
ary" theory, by which, because of the disparity in expertise between clients and securi-
ties professionals, the professionals owe fiduciary duties which predominate over their
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but nowhere does it consider the option of no action or no regulation.
Unfortunately for the consumer/user sovereignty case, governments,
commissions, and regulators do not receive credit for doing nothing.
These options are discussed hereunder.
3.1.1. Registration
4
4
When widespread noncompliance and the subsequent failure of a
privately operated Registry resulted in the abolition in the early 1980s
of the Registry of Business Names in the U.K., and thus the disclosure
of the names of natural persons behind the business name, the question
was raised whether such registration had ever been to anyone's
benefit.4
5
If there is no provision surrounding the denial of the right to en-
gage in the registered activity, competitive forces are unaffected, al-
though in practice qualifying conditions are usually required for
registration.'6
3.1.2. Certification4
7
Certification by a tribunal, government, industry, or private body
indicates possession of certain skills but does not or should not prevent
access to the market by uncertified persons. Hence, a registered builder
or licensed contractor can coexist with any other builder or contractor,
as can an accountant (Certified Public or Chartered Accountant) along-
side any other accountant. At a certain level barriers to entry and the
resulting expense would be ignored by those in the industry.
Certification without licensure has the advantages of protection
against monopolization or cartelization by the industry; satisfying the
licensure paternalism arguments;"8 providing information to users; evi-
dencing compliance with declared standards of skill and training as
some proof of expertise; and not foreclosing the development of skills by
newcomers, nor leaving "the door of opportunity open for [persons]
contractual duties. Good character is especially relevant when an occupation is the sub-
ject of regulation in the public interest. See also W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 129.
Securities professionals also owe a duty to government and to the securities markets. (3)
"Source of Money" theory, by which liability is imposed on securities professionals for
the practical reason that they are often the continuing solvent person, "insurer", or
"deep-pocket", and thus through them risk is effectively spread.
43 REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 5.4-.8.
" See id. para. 5.5.
"See generally GowER REPORT, supra note 42.
4 Id.
"I Id. para. 5.6.
1, M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 149.
1987]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
who are occupationally gifted though not conventionally schooled."149 Of
the four options considered, certification is most consistent with a com-
petitive market and a consumer sovereignty. 50 As such, certification
warrants further consideration in the Review rather than the cursory
dismissal received.
3.1.3. Licensing51
Any scheme of licensing must return to first principles and be a
preventive measure to guard users from victimization rather than an
economic weapon intended to strengthen the licensees.52 It must not
affect consumer sovereignty. The very weakly presented case against
licensing53 does not address Friedman's paternalism argument:
Individuals, it is said, are incapable of choosing their
own servants adequately, their own physician or plumber or
barber. In order for a man to choose a physician intelli-
gently, he would have to be a physician himself. Most of us,
it is said, are therefore incompetent and we must be pro-
tected against our own ignorance. This amounts to saying
that we in our capacity as voters must protect ourselves in
our capacity as consumers against our own ignorance, by
seeing to it that people are not served by incompetent physi-
cians or plumbers or barbers."
Nor does the Review draw a distinction between instances where
licensing may be justified, namely, in the "special case which arises
when an occupation of critical public importance has been overrun, and
not merely occasionally infected, by persons insensitive to their respon-
sibilities." 55 There is no evidence of widespread failure of Australian
securities professionals beyond the failures in the 1960s reported in the
49 W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 148.
50 Cf M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 145 (registration is most consistent with
liberalism).
5' REvIEw, supra note 1, para. 5.7.
52 Id. para. 5.28.
51 Id. para. 3.31 (discussing burgeoning growth leading to "a flood of paper," a
breakdown in the ability of the NCSC (National Companies and Securities Commis-
sion) to monitor licensing provisions, and other administrative difficulties). The RE-
vIEw reports that "[t]he Commission noted with interest that many of the submissions
expressed concern about the conduct of license holders rather than the licensing system
itself." See also id. paras. 5.9-.28 (discussing factors which lead the NCSC to recom-
mend licensing in spite of the fact that it is typically anticompetitive).
" M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 148.
51 W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 145.
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Australian Rae Report."6 Where user choice is wide, the argument for
licensing - whether by external regulation or by self-regulation - is
weak.
57
The argument for licensing is stronger where the user cannot
choose who will serve him, or arguably where the user is too distant to
know the facts about his servant (such as dealing with a securities pro-
fessional). However, the existence of such evils must be demonstrated
and proved, rather than being based on the suppositions underlying the
Review.
3.1.4. Negative Licensing
The jurisdiction of an authority such as the Commission or a li-
censing tribunal to issue or to obtain an order prohibiting a person
from engaging in an occupation for breach of a rule or for unacceptable
conduct is an option that deserves consideration. Such power would be
compatible with the consumer sovereignty theme of this paper, and
need not involve the entrenchment of the SROs or other industry
groups as proposed in the Review.
58
4. RAMIFICATIONS OF REGULATION BY SELF-REGULATORY
ORGANIZATIONS
The U.S. Congress has placed great emphasis on the self-regula-
.tion of market actors in the securities industry, through both adminis-
trative and judicial supervision of stock exchanges and of securities in-
dustry professional associations.59
In contrast to the self-regulation in the U.K., where compliance is
voluntary and where there is not really the possibility of U.K. govern-
ment intervention by statute, 0 the U.S. and Canadian schemes, as well
as the proposed Australian self-regulation scheme, are not independent
of some external accountability and outside supervision. 1 Such inter-
5' See supra note 30.
57 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 5.8.
51 See id. para. 5.10-.13.
5' See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a(a) (1982) (conferring
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Act and the rules promulgated under it to
the U.S. district courts); see also Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violation of an SEC rule prohibiting
deceptive practices in the purchase and sale of securities).
60 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 10.17.
*' Section 78o of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains the primary provi-
sions regarding broker-dealer registration and administration. In particular, Section
78o(b)(4) authorizes the SEC to censure, to place limitations on the activities, or to
suspend or revoke registration of any broker or dealer, especially in subsection (A)
where there has been a willful violation of the securities legislation or regulations. Sec-
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vention is arguably very important in order to ensure that self-regula-
tion works, as government must be assured that the SROs actually per-
form their regulatory functions.62 Regulation also must replace
impairment of competition, and supervision of a quasi-public utility is
necessary for efficiency. 3
Self-regulation is perceived as having the benefit of "the expertise
and intimate familiarity with complex securities operations which
members of the industry can bring to bear on regulatory problems, and
the informality and flexibility of self-regulatory procedures."'" The
tion 78s of the Act and the associated rules provide for SRO registration and responsi-
bilities, and for SEC oversight of SROs.
Section 78o-3(b) of the SEC Act sets the criteria which the SEC must consider
prior to approval of a national securities association of an association of brokers and
dealers.
(1)The association must have the organization and capacity to carry out the pur-
poses of the Act, and must be able to comply with, and to enforce compliance with, the
Act by its members and persons associated with its members. § 78o-3(b)(1).
(2)The rules of the association must provide that any registered broker or dealer
may become a member. § 78o-3(b)(3) (subject to subsection (g) of this section).
(3)The rules of the association assure a fair representation of its members in selec-
tion of directors and administration of its affairs. § 78o-3(b)(4).
(4)The rules of the association provide for the equitable allocation of dues, fees,
etc., among members. § 78o-3(b)(5).
(5)The rules of the association foster equitable principles of trade, and are
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. § 78o-3(b)(6).
(6)The rules of the association provide for appropriate disciplining of members
and accounted persons, § 78o-3(b)(7), and provide a fair procedure for such discipline.
§ 78o-3(b)(8).
(7)The rules of the association do not impose any burden on competition. § 78o-
3(b)(9).
Self-regulation of stock exchanges is built into the Australian securities industry by
the Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 66 and Codes. This legislation
allows for the continuation of stock exchange rules and procedures, subject to overriding
Court and/or Commission sanction under sections 14, 42. Securities Industries Act,
AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 66, §§ 14, 42. However, the SRO proposal, subject to overriding
Ministerial Council and/or Commission supervision, does not fully address the carte-
lization issue and the potential windfall of the self-regulated. The REVIEW gives no
consideration to alternatives to licensing - why regulate or self-regulate at all? - why
not ensure the market works competitively and regulates itself? See REVIEW, supra
note 1. Nor does the REVIEW stress that membership of an SRO is not proposed as a
precondition to the holding of a proposed Securities Industry License or that regulation
by the Commission (as a kind of SRO) would continue alongside the proposed SROs.
Cf id. paras. 10.44(a), 10.46, 10.55, 10.64.
6'2 Dey & Makuch, Government Supervision of Self-Regulatory Organizations in
the Canadian Securities Industry, in 3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW
FOR CANADA 1399, 1442 (1979) (citing SEC, 4 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1963)).
8 Id. at 1442-43.
6' SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), cited in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 616 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980).
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transfer of the administrative workload from a government agency to
the SRO itself can save money for the public sector and thereby enable
more effective use of government resources.
Several questions arise, however, especially with respect to exter-
nal surveillance of the adequacy of self-regulation. These questions
have not been fully addressed in the Review, yet they highlight dangers
to be borne in mind when considering the effectiveness of self-regula-
tion. In the Report of the Windfall Royal Commission, Justice Kelly
observed that self-regulation on the Toronto Stock Exchange prior to
the introduction of external supervision of the Exchange displayed the
following three weaknesses: (1) the rulemaking did not keep pace with
loopholing deficiencies in the rules; (2) there was widespread aberra-
tion from strict observance of the spirit of the rules; and (3) there was
"woeful lack of any effective surveillance to ensure the adherence to
rule."
65
Because of these weaknesses, any review of SROs must ensure dis-
closure of information on the SRO internal operations. In particular,
because of the public utility function of SROs, there must be public
accountability. The question is, to whom? The Commission? The pub-
lic? The legislature? With the legislated status of an SRO goes public
accountability and responsibility.
The Australian proposal to pass management of the SRO legisla-
tion/administrative action to the industry requires careful considera-
*tion. The justification for handing over administration to the recognized
experts, if the industry so qualifies, has immediate appeal in that it
avoids political patronage and partisanship and ensures expert and in-
formed administration.66 However, this inevitably leads to control by
the regulators. For example, in 1956, Professor Walter Gellhorn stated
that seventy-five percent of U.S. occupational licensing boards were
composed exclusively of licensed practitioners of the respective occupa-
tions who, by definition, had an economic interest in many of the the
decisions they made concerning admission requirements and standards
to be observed by licensees.6 7 As with the SRO plan, the licensing
boards directly represented organized groups within the occupation and
were often nominated by the industry for self-regulation. 8
Even if the industry experts do not have a majority of places on
'5 ONTARIO ROYAL COMMISSION, THE WINDFALL REPORT 100 (1965), cited in
Dey & Makuch, supra note 62, at 1428. The Windfall Report was the result of an
inquiry into the trading of Windfall Oils and Mines limited shares, with an eye to-
wards evaluating the role of the government in supervising the operation of SROs.
" See, e.g., RAE REPORT, supra note 30, at 16.12-.13.
67 W. GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 140.
68 Id.
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the regulatory board, representatives of other related professional
groups such as accountants and lawyers tend to outnumber any lay or
consumer representatives who often lack sufficient knowledge or confi-
dence to provide a view to balance that of the experts.
The legislation/administrative action proposed appears to fit the
pattern of this model with the expected biases towards the industry and
its regulators. Indeed, the Australian Commission regularly boasts of its
close and satisfactory relationship with the securities industry.69
The Review contains no view opposing that of the regulators (the
Commission proposal and the proposed SROs), and the "checks and
balances"'70 provide only limited control over the naturally self-seeking
operation of the proposed SROs.
Any review of SROs must address the powers of the government,
through the Commission, to regulate SROs in the public interest. In
particular, the following anticompetitive and jurisdictional issues must
be considered.
4.1. Anticompetitive Factors
Section 15A(b)(9) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires
for SEC approval as an SRO evidence, inter alia, that the rules of the
association do not impose an inappropriate burden on competition.7 In
a similar vein, the Review lists the following criteria to be satisfied
before an SRO may be approved by the Australian Commission:
(a) demonstrating that it would be capable of properly
exercising its functions as a securities industry SRO, being
the functions of regulating its affairs in the interests of the
public and of administering and enforcing its business rules;
(b) that, if it will operate other than an approved secur-
ities industry SRO -
(i) its operations will not interfere with its opera-
tion as a securities industry SRO; and
(ii) its business rules provide for a separate class of
membership for a person to whom its operation as a
securities industry SRO relates whether or not such a
person may be a member within another class of
membership;
(c) that its business rules make satisfactory provision -
:9 See REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 10.3, 10.42.
70 See, e.g., id. paras. 1.6, 2.1, 10.43-.46.
71 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(8) (1982).
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(i) for the admission as members of persons li-
censed or proposing to apply to be licensed under the
Act, or a specified class of such persons;
(ii) for the standards of training and experience,
and other qualifications, for membership;
(iii) for the manner in which members are to con-
duct their business of dealing in or advising on securi-
ties so as to ensure efficient and honest practices in re-
lation to that business;
(iv) for the exclusion of a body corporate from
membership where a director of the body corporate, a
person concerned in the management of the body corpo-
rate or a person who has control, or substantial control,
of the body corporate would himself be excluded from
membership (except where that exclusion would be
based upon an educational requirement);
(v) for the exclusion from membership of a person
who is not of good character and high business
integrity;
(vi) for the expulsion, suspension or disciplining of
members for conduct inconsistent with just and equita-
ble principles in the transaction of business or for a
contravention of or failure to comply with the business
rules of the proposed securities industry SRO or the
provisions of this Act;
(vii) for an appropriate mechanism whereby a per-
son aggrieved by the refusal of an application for mem-
bership or by any of the actions referred to in subpara-
graphs (iv), (v) and (vi) may appeal to an independent
body in respect of the refusal or action;
(viii) for the inspection and audit of the accounting
records of members required to be kept by the Act."
Comprehensive as they appear, it remains to be seen whether these
criteria accord with the U.S. experience, and, in particular, whether
regard has been paid to the following competitive criteria set forth di-
rectly below.
4.1.2. Restrictions on Entry
Will the proposed self-regulation readily allow a qualified or ex-
72 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 10.43.
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perienced person (such as a dealer qualified and/or experienced over-
seas) to be granted a securities industry license?
Economic theory suggests that occupational regulation favors ex-
isting members to the detriment of aspiring members. New regulation
tends to entrench existing members, restrict numbers, and raise incomes
and costs to users whether or not the users gain any benefit from the
regulation.73 Existing members benefit further because they do not pay
for the new regulations and the extra requirements.
The extra requirements proposed for aspiring securities industry
licensees fit this anticompetitive model by erecting barriers to entry.
The existing members qualify for a license on two years experience in
the industry; aspiring members will be required at least to attend a
course involving 100-120 teaching contract hours provided by institu-
tions yet to be determined. 4 While there is some merit in the proposed
requirement of formal studies in law and economics, what safeguard is
proposed to ensure that this course does not serve anticompetitive
purposes?
4.1.3. Code of Behavior! Code of Ethics
Will the proposed code of behavior/code of ethics to be promul-
gated 5 allow for free play of market forces?
Economic theory shows that such codes are usually anticompetitive
and paternalistic in that they (1) prevent elaborate and attention-seek-
ing advertising; (2) prevent poaching by competitors; (3) disadvantage
new entrants to the industry who cannot advertise; (4) restrict informa-
tion for users; and (5) deny consumer sovereignty by denying the con-
sumer the option to decide just what the consumer wants.
7
1
The Review proposes to give the SRO the right to regulate the
conduct of its members, but no user benefit is stated. 7 Only if SRO
membership is not a prerequisite to carrying on business as a securities
professional could these powers be given to an SRO. Market forces
would then operate to maintain competition. The user must retain the
freedom to choose based upon relevant full information and knowledge
of the options.
71 See Duggan, supra note 38, at 172.
"I See REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 7.5, 7.12. But see id. para. 7.18 (acknowl-
edging that experience requirements should take account of "barrier to entry"
considerations).
75 Id. paras. 10.43(c)(iii), 10.52.
71 See, e.g., Duggan, supra note 38, at 174-75.
7 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 10.53; see also id. para. 10.56 (recommending
that SROs monitor and review the financial position and reports of their members).
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4.1.4. Quality and Price of Service
The Review does not promote the development of new products
and services.7 Are these to be encouraged, or are they to be restricted
and regulated by the business rules of the proposed SROs presumably
to the advantage of the existing suppliers and their products? Are the
SROs to have control of prices, commissions, and so forth, so as to
maintain a "reasonable" return to members in times of economic down-
turn? Are recommended prices to be permitted insofar as they are per-
mitted under competition legislation? An effective and competitive sys-
tem of self-regulation must address these questions.
4.1.5. Compensation Fund
The proposed national fidelity fund would appear to provide a
certain and fairly complete protection for investors.79 It must, however,
be remembered that contributions to the fund will have a social cost if
not related to the risk of default or other fraudulent practices. To be
fair to contributors, the fund must be regulated by the market test of
similar "insurance" schemes.
4.2. Commission Must Have Sufficient Regulatory Powers Over
SROs
Theories of regulation indicate the ease with which regulation
comes to the benefit of the regulated.80 Attention must be paid to en-
sure control is beyond that of the industry/interest groups which will
form SROs.
Has the Commission and/or the Ministerial Council sufficient
power to regulate SROs? Has thought been given to how best to gauge
and enforce the interests of the public generally and users specifically?
Have class action/representative actions been considered for their use-
fulness as an enfranchising device?
The Review goes some way towards articulating the proposition
that it is important, for reasons of competition and control, that SROs
answer not to themselves but to the external Commission as some bal-
78 See id. paras. 3.22-.29.
79 See id. paras. 8.107(c), -.111, -.112.
SO See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text (analyzing the four types of oc-
cupational licensure discussed in the REVIEW and their tendency to increase the mo-
nopoly position of existing members); see also infra notes 110-18 and accompanying
text (discussing the REVIEW'S failure to address the central aspects of economic theories
of regulation).
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ance to the natural gravitation towards self-gratification."' Nonetheless,
serious lacunae are evident in the proposed regulatory scheme.
4.2.1. Commission Must Be Assured That SROs Actually Perform
Their Regulatory Functions
In the absence of performance of regulatory functions by the
SROs, the facade of self-regulation will be worse than no public protec-
tion at all. Hence, regulation should revert in such instances to the gov-
ernment or the Commission. The Review, cognizant of this issue, pro-
poses to endow the Ministerial Council with the power to cancel SRO
approval.8 2
While Section 42 of the Securities Industry Act and Codes,8 3 em-
powering the court to order observance or enforcement of stock ex-
change business rules or listing rules, provides the model for Commis-
sion oversight of SROs, U.S. law gives significantly greater powers to
the SEC to supervise SROs. SRO administrative disciplinary proceed-
ings are subject to SEC oversight.8 ' Written conclusions of an SRO
must be filed with the SEC, which may review the matter on its own
motion or on the motion of an aggrieved party.8 5 The SEC can then
affirm or modify an SRO sanction, or remand to the SRO for further
consideration. 8
4.2.2. Power to Suspend or Cancel SRO Approval
The Australian Commission should have the power to suspend or
cancel SRO approval in line with the power of the Ministerial Council
to approve and therefore to disapprove a stock exchange under the Se-
curities Industry Act and Codes Section 38. Similarly, the power to
suspend or revoke registration, to censure, or to impose limitations on
SRO activities, when after notice and opportunity for a hearing an
SRO has been found to have violated the law, could be strengthened in
line with Securities Exchange Act Section 19(h)(1).8 '
11 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 10.44 (discussing the structure of a statutory
framework for governing SROs); see, e.g., id. para. 10.34 (summarizing several posi-
tions opposing self-regulation by SROs).
82 Id. para. 10.44(a).
83 Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 66, § 42.
84 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d), (e) (1982).
88 Id. § 78s(d)(1), (2).
a Id. § 78s(e)(1), (2); see also Application of Wall Street West, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 18, 320, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,
069 (Dec. 9, 1981) (findings of violation and sanctions by NASD exchange upheld by
SEC).
8" 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1975). See generally Lipton, Governance of Our Securi-
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4.2.3. Publication of SRO Particulars
Information is required for an informed market, and the proposal
to notify officially and publicly details of SRO approval, suspension,
and cancellation is an important means of informing the market.88
4.2.4. Appeal to the Court by SRO Members
Persons whose membership in an SRO is denied or otherwise af-
fected should have the right of appeal to an outside body such as the
Commission or the courts. This principle is important to ensure outside
redress, and as another balance to the natural gravitation of the regu-
lated to self-gratification.
Securities Exchange Act Section 25 gives a person aggrieved by a
final order of the SEC recourse to the U.S. Court of Appeals.8" Simi-
larly, in Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) is supervised by
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). The Australian scheme
should make available such an outside appeal.
4.2.5. Notification to Commission of Amendments to SRO Business
Rules
The proposed procedure for notification of amendments to SRO
business rules parallels in part the existing procedure for notification of
amendments to stock exchange business rules.9" The proposal, however,
contains no public interest requirement as a basis for amendment,92 and
the apparently arbitrary but very short period of twelve days is recom-
mended."' The public interest requirement and more manageable
ties Markets and Failure to Allocate Regulatory Responsibility, 34 CATH. U.L. REV.
397, 401-08 (1985) (discussing sanctions against SROs in the context of the division of
regulatory authority between the SEC and the exchanges themselves).
88 REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 10.57-.58; see also id. para. 10.44(b) (outlining
the notification requirement as part of the overall statutory framework).
s9 See, e.g., Sorrell v. SEC, 679 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1982); Sirianni v. SEC, 677
F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1982).
so The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) must recognize the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSE) in writing before the TSE can operate as an exchange. Regarding
governance, the OSC can make any directive, etc., on the activities of the TSE, or
relating to the internal rules of the TSE. As a review procedure, the OSC can hear
appeals from TSE decisions by any person affected. Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT.
ch. 466, § 9.1(22) (1980), amended by ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 59 (1984); Dey &
Makuch, supra note 62, at 1443.
*' Securities Industry Act, 1980, AUSTL. Acrs P. No. 66, § 39.
s See, e.g., id. § 38(2)(d).
Compare id. § 38(2)(d) with id. § 39(3) (allows 21 days for publication of
amendments to exchange rules before the amendment ceases to have effect for failure of
public notice).
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twenty-one day notice period of the Securities Industry Act and Codes
should both be included in the proposed scheme.
4.2.6. Power of Investigation
The power of investigation by the Commission into SROs and
their activities would be an important factor in its administration of
SROs and their self-regulation. Presumably, the Securities Industry
Act Codes would authorize such investigation.94
The powers of the SEC provide a useful comparison and a model
for development of the powers of the Commission. The SEC is empow-
ered, under Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act, to investigate
possible violations of securities laws.95 If the investigation discloses vio-
lations by brokers/dealers or investment advisers, the SEC can proceed
under Section 15(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act to invoke disci-
plinary measures, such as censure, limitation of activities, suspension
for up to one year, and revocation of registration.98 To so proceed, the
SEC must show that the firm or individual willfully made a material
misstatement to the SEC, willfully violated the securities acts, or will-
fully aided or abetted the violation of such statutes.
97
4.2.7. Power to Discipline Related Persons
Does the Commission's power of discipline over SROs extend to
persons associated with a member of an SRO? In the U.S., the SEC
can discipline persons associated with an SRO member firm by sus-
pending or barring such persons from association with members of the
organization. 8
The paragraphs in the Review addressed to discipline of securities
professionals do not consider whether those once removed, such as law-
yers, investment bankers, and spouses, should also fall within the Com-
mission's disciplinary net. Presumably, they could be subject to such
discipline under other legislative sources, such as the penalty provisions
of the Securities Industry Act and Codes.99 The Review also fails to
Id. §§ 15-36 (Investigations).
,5 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1975) (broad authority and discretion given to SEC to
investigate violations).
" Id. § 78o(b)(4). The SEC can also bring suit in the district court to enjoin
behavior "[w]herever it shall appear . . . that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts ... constituting a violation of exchange rules .... " Id. § 78u(d).
" Id. § 78s(c)(4)(A), (D), (E).
9s Id. § 78s(h)(3).
" See, e.g., Securities Industry Act, 1980, AusTL. ACTs P. No. 66, § 42 (1980)
(giving the court power to enforce rule of the exchange against "any person under an
obligation to comply with, observe, enforce or give effect to ... the rules of ... [the
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consider the question of persons associated for various breaches speci-
fied.1 0 The discipline of related persons must be further addressed by
any comprehensive regulatory scheme.
4.2.8. Power to Ensure That SRO Rules Are Just And Equitable
The Review recommends that the business rules of a proposed
SRO require the "just and equitable" conduct of SRO members and
the carrying on of business "with due regard for the interests and pro-
tection of the public."
101
Are these requirements stated with sufficient strength or is "satis-
factory provision" too elusive a standard? Section 15A(b)(6) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act states the U.S. equivalent more boldly when it
says that "[a]n association . . . shall not be registered . . . unless the
[SEC] determines that. . . (6)[t]he rules of the association are designed
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote
just and equitable principles of trade."' 2 Similarly, the U.S. exchanges
are under the same obligations to establish rules to further "just and
equitable principles of trade"' 03 and to enforce compliance with such
rules.' o4
4.3. Commission Must Have Power to SuspendlRevoke Securities
Industry License
The Review proposes the granting of power to the Commission to
revoke a Securities Industry License. 05 It also proposes the legislation
be drafted so as to impose no obligation on the Commission to divulge
information on request.0 8 This seems unduly authoritarian in these
days of administrative law and freedom of information, and no case for
such heavy-handed secrecy has been advanced.
Comparison can be made with Securities Exchange Act Section
19(h)(2) which retains for the SEC - regardless of the position of the
SRO - the upper hand of license suspension if in the public interest,
exchange] . . . "); id. § 128 (forbidding insider trading by several classes of people,
and allowing sanctions against the same).
100 See, e.g., REVIEW, supra note 1, paras. 9.28-.30 (discipline provisions limited
to representatives or employees of representatives within the securities industry); id.
paras. 10.59-.60 (disciplinary action by the associations only considered in relation to
members).
101 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 10.43(c)(vi), (x).
102 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1975).
103 Id. § 78f(b)(5).
104 Id. §§ 78f(b)(1), (6), 78s(h)(1).
105 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 9.6 (Recommendation 9.1).
110 Id. para. 9.32 (Recommendation 9.7).
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for the protection of investors, and/or for the purposes of the
legislation.
10 7
4.4. SROs Must Have Sufficient Powers to Regulate their Members
(Subject to Commission Oversight)
The Review proposes that SROs share with the Commission in the
administration of discipline of their members, and touches upon the
scope of SRO regulation. 0 8
The level of SRO obligation of enforcement is not specified, how-
ever,10 9 and it is suggested that attention be paid to the following two
questions on the scope of the SRO authority. (1) Must SRO rules pro-
vide for discipline of members? Securities Exchange Act Section
15A(b)(7) requires that SRO rules provide that members, and persons
associated with members, be disciplined for violation of securities law
"by expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions and opera-
tions, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being associated
with a member, or any other fitting sanction." 10 (2) Must SROs en-
force compliance by members with securities law? Again, Securities
Exchange Act Section 15A(b)(2) requires that the association have the
capacity "to enforce compliance by its members and persons associated
with its members" with securities legislation. 11
5. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF REGULATION
The Review proposes new initiatives. Delegation of the adminis-
tration of broker-dealers who are SRO members to the SRO qualified
self-regulation, and inclusion of previously "exempt" dealers (banks,
insurance companies) warrant further study. As presented in this arti-
cle, the ramifications of many of the issues, especially those with
lengthy track records in North America, have been inadequately as-
sessed. Nowhere does the Review consider whether the proposed quali-
fied self-regulation could provide any improvement over the current
system of licensing, with minor supervision by Australia's eight Corpo-
107 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(2) (1976).
108 REVIEW, supra note 1, para. 10.61 (Recommendation 10.7).
109 See id. para. 10.43(c)(iii), (v), (vi) (Recommendation 10.1).
110 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (1976).
111 Id. § 78o-3(b)(2); see also id. § 78s(g)(1)(A) (a registered national securities
exchange must enforce compliance with its rules by its members and their associates
unless there is a reasonable justification or excuse for non-enforcement); cf. Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944) (stating that New York Stock Exchange "vio-
lated a duty when it failed to take disciplinary action against [partner in a Stock Ex-
change firm] after there was reason to believe that the latter had converted the plain-
tiffs' securities.").
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rate Affairs Commissions (as delegates of the National Companies and
Securities Commission). Nor does it consider the alternative of no li-
censing at all."1 ' Certainly the Review fails to address the breadth of
economic theory and literature dealing with the costs, effects, and bene-
fits of regulation and self-regulation. 1 Accordingly, it reads in parts
like the rather narrow-minded, black-letter consumerism reports char-
acteristic of the 1960s and 1970s.
Presumably, the Review does agree with the basic proposition of
economic theory that voluntary exchange is mutually advantageous;
that is why the buyer buys and the seller sells. The Review does not
articulate and does not seek to reinforce, advance, or confirm the as-
sumptions underlying this proposition. These assumptions are that: (1)
ignorance must be dispelled so that both buyer and seller are well-in-
formed about the things exchanged; (2) there must be a perfect and
efficient market, with no market imperfections impeding the flow of
resources into or out of the industry; (3) both parties know what they
prefer; and (4) individuals are the best judge of their own self-
interest.
11 4
The Review, therefore, fails to address the central tasks of the the-
ory of economic regulation, and does not explain who will receive the
benefits or burdens of the proposed regulation; nor does it explain the
details, if any, on the maintenance of competitive forces and freedom of
entry in the proposed system of regulation. Its explanation is lacking as
well as to the effects of the proposed regulation on the allocation of
resources.1
1 5
By ignoring consideration of economic theories of regulation,1" 6 the
112 This alternative was in practice before the first Securities Industry Act was
passed. See, e.g., Securities Industry Act, 1970 N.S.W. STAT. No. 35.
113 See, e.g., AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 16, INSURANCE
AGENTS AND BROKERS paras. 124-126, at 78-80 (1980).
114 See, e.g., Parish, Industrial Censorship, 22 QUADRANT 12, 12 (1978).
1'5 See Fels, The Political Economy of Regulation, 5 U. N. S.W. L.J. 29, 32
(1982).
11I Several hypotheses concerning the effects of regulation are set out in Fels,
supra note 115, at 32-38.
(a) The Consumer Protection Hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, regulation is
passed in response to the actual or potential failure of the market to protect consumer
interests. Traditionally, unquestioned areas of regulation included the legal profession,
health care, and drug and product safety.
(b) The Perversion Hypothesis. This hypothesis states that, although the intended
purpose of regulation is to protect consumers, the regulated industries ultimately "per-
vert" their regulators. The result of this perversion is that the regulators come to iden-
tify with the regulated and become the protectors of the regulated. But see Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sot. 335, 341-42 (1974)
(finding the "Capture Theory" unsatisfactory).
(c) The No-Effect Hypothesis. This hypothesis states that regulation achieves no
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Review fails to recognize that intervention allegedly made in the con-
sumer interest is often perverse in its effects. It can be ineffective, or
inefficient in achieving its purpose at high cost. Such failure can often
be traced to the following factors: 1) inattention to basic economic prin-
ciples, and especially neglect or underestimation of the responses of the
economic person who rationally pursues self-interest and reacts to in-
centives and disincentives; 2) failure to explore the full consequences,
including the incidental and remote consequences of the proposed regu-
lation; and 3) disregard or underestimation of the cost of the proposed
regulation.11
7
The Review does not articulate these economic assumptions, and
fails to pay regard to the principle of consumer sovereignty characteris-
tic of a democratic society. 1 8 The state, through its regulatory agencies,
does not know better than consumers themselves about what is good for
consumers. Both parties - buyer and seller, government and governed
- know what they prefer, and individuals are the best judges of their
own self-interest. Regulation in accordance with consumer sovereignty
can be justified only in certain instances, through well-tailored mecha-
nisms. For example, it is appropriate to dispel ignorance so that the
balance is redressed to ensure that buyer and seller are well-informed
about the things exchanged. In brief, the intervention should be to sub-
sidize not the regulation but the provision of information.' Interven-
significant effect beyond imposing compliance costs (e.g., filling in forms, having law-
yers, and diverting management time from productive activities).
(d) The Producer Protection Hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the effect of regu-
lation is to increase or sustain the economic power of the regulated industry.
(e) The Theory of Economic Regulation. Under this theory, economic regulation --
the coercive power of the government -- is a product whose allocation is governed by
laws of supply and demand. Viewed as a product supplied to interest groups rather
than an expression of the social interest in efficiency or justice, regulation tends to
convert formerly competitive or oligopolistic industries into cartels. See Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Posner,
supra, at 343.
Fels also notes that the chief beneficiaries of regulation, and the primary forces in
the maintenance of regulation, are the regulators themselves. He concludes that this has
"considerable appeal" as a possible hypothesis.
117 See Parish, supra note 114, at 13.
18 See generally M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980); J.S.
MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (People's ed. 1865) ("The Sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self protection . . . . Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign."); A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 458 (E. Cannan 5th
ed. 1930) ("The proposition [that the majority would prefer to pursue, unrestricted,
their own economic ends] is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains
to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question had not the interested sophis-
try of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind.").
119 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681 (1984) (noting that mandatory disclosure system is
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tion is also appropriate to correct market imperfections. For example,
as the Review recognizes, the high cost of litigation discourages buyer
redress for fraud or deception. In such a case, the solution is to reduce
litigation costs to enable ready legal redress at the lower end of the
market, such as by establishment of a securities tribunal or the like, or
by redefining the jurisdiction of the existing consumer-oriented Small
Claims Tribunals. 2 ° Finally, where a group such as stockbrokers
achieves a natural monopoly, a comprehensive regulatory scheme must
ensure that the competitive provisions of trade practices law apply and
continue to apply to the group and to new groups in the industry."'
6. CONCLUSION
The National Companies and Securities Commission's review of Aus-
tralia's licensing provisions in the securities industry is a detailed docu-
ment covering many issues. It borrows many initiatives from North
American models, but sometimes fails to address basic policy issues
such as the likelihood of cartelization for SRO members, the need for
external constraints on SRO activities, and the necessity of maintaining
and promoting Commission registration as a quasi-SRO in its own
right (as an alternative to dealing through an SRO). Thus, nowhere
are the actual benefits and advantages of any registration stated; in this
light, the proposals in the Review should be given less authority than
they have assumed.
often justified on ground that markets in some circumstances produce "too little" infor-
mation about securities). But see M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 118, at
222-26 (arguing that uninhibited market competition usually "protects government
mechanisms that have been increasingly superimposed on the market"); Easterbrook &
Fischel supra, at 692-96 (poorly supported rationales for mandatory disclosure include
the need to protect the unsophisticated investor and the need to increase the supply of
truthful information).
120 See, e.g., O'Connor, Repatriation Appeals Made Easier, 59 LAW INST. J. 58
(1985) (Repatriation Legislation Amendment simplifies review procedures and stream-
lines handling of veterans' pension claims, thereby alleviating claim backlog and expe-
diting appeals).
' Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Trade Practices
Act, 1974, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 51.
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
